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Chuck Darwin<p>Not <a href="https://c.im/tags/SantaBarbara" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>SantaBarbara</span></a>'s <br>Ray Hunter</p><p><a href="https://www.waterhousegallery.com/Ray%20Hunter.html" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">waterhousegallery.com/Ray%20Hu</span><span class="invisible">nter.html</span></a></p><p> <a href="https://c.im/tags/CSS" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>CSS</span></a> <a href="https://c.im/tags/Stingrays" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Stingrays</span></a> <a href="https://c.im/tags/IMSI" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>IMSI</span></a> <a href="https://c.im/tags/catchers" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>catchers</span></a></p>
Chuck Darwin<p>Meet Rayhunter: <br>A New Open Source Tool from EFF to Detect Cellular Spying</p><p>At EFF we spend a lot of time thinking about Street Level Surveillance technologies<br>—the technologies used by police and other authorities to spy on you while you are going about your everyday life<br>—such as automated license plate readers, <br>facial recognition, <br>surveillance camera networks, <br>and cell-site simulators (. <a href="https://c.im/tags/CSS" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>CSS</span></a> ). </p><p>Rayhunter is a new open source tool we’ve created that runs off an affordable mobile hotspot that we hope empowers everyone, <br>regardless of technical skill, <br>to help search out CSS around the world. </p><p>CSS<br> (also known as <a href="https://c.im/tags/Stingrays" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Stingrays</span></a> or <a href="https://c.im/tags/IMSI" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>IMSI</span></a> <a href="https://c.im/tags/catchers" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>catchers</span></a>) <br>are devices that masquerade as legitimate cell-phone towers, <br>tricking phones within a certain radius into connecting to the device rather than a tower. </p><p>CSS operate by conducting a general search of all cell phones within the device’s radius. </p><p>Law enforcement use CSS to pinpoint the location of phones <br>often with greater accuracy than other techniques such as cell site location information (CSLI) <br>and without needing to involve the phone company at all. </p><p>CSS can also log International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (IMSI numbers) unique to each SIM card, <br>or hardware serial numbers (IMEIs) of all of the mobile devices within a given area. </p><p>Some CSS may have advanced features allowing law enforcement to intercept communications in some circumstances.</p><p>What makes CSS especially interesting, as compared to other street level surveillance, is that <br>so little is known about how commercial CSS work. </p><p>We don’t fully know what capabilities they have <br>or what exploits in the phone network they take advantage of to ensnare and spy on our phones, though we have some ideas. </p><p>We also know very little about how cell-site simulators are deployed in the US and around the world. </p><p>There is no strong evidence either way about whether CSS are commonly being used in the US to spy on First Amendment protected activities <br>such as protests, communication between journalists and sources, or religious gatherings. </p><p>There is some evidence<br>—much of it circumstantial<br>—that CSS have been used in the US to spy on protests. </p><p>There is also evidence that CSS are used somewhat extensively by US law enforcement, <br>spyware operators, and scammers. </p><p>We know even less about how CSS are being used in other countries, <br>though it's a safe bet that in other countries CSS are also used by law enforcement.</p><p>Much of these gaps in our knowledge are due to a lack of solid, empirical evidence about the function and usage of these devices. </p><p>Police departments are resistant to releasing logs of their use, <br>even when they are kept. </p><p>The companies that manufacture CSS are unwilling to divulge details of how they work. </p><p>Until now, to detect the presence of CSS, researchers and users have had to either rely on Android apps on rooted phones, <br>or sophisticated and expensive software-defined radio rigs. </p><p>Previous solutions have also focused on attacks on the legacy 2G cellular network, which is almost entirely shut down in the U.S. </p><p>Seeking to learn from and improve on previous techniques for CSS detection we have developed a better, cheaper alternative that works natively on the modern 4G network.</p><p><a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/meet-rayhunter-new-open-source-tool-eff-detect-cellular-spying" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/meet</span><span class="invisible">-rayhunter-new-open-source-tool-eff-detect-cellular-spying</span></a></p>